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I. EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. THE PROMPT PAYMENT OF CLAIMS STATUTE1
1. The Statute Does Not Apply to a Liability Insurer's Indemnity
Obligations
HE Statute authorizes an award of eighteen percent annual inter-Test and attorney's fees when an insurer wrongfully refuses or de-
lays payment of a "claim."' 2 The Statute defines the term "claim"
as a "first-party claim" that is "made by an insured" and that "must be
paid by the insurer directly to the insured," but does not separately define
the term "first-party claim."'3 In Evanston Insurance Co. v. ATOFINA
Petrochemicals, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court held that the Statute does
not extend to an insured's claim under a liability policy for indemnifica-
tion of a third-party claim.4
After the insurer denied coverage, the insured settled with the third-
party claimant and then sued the insurer for recovery of the settlement
amount it had paid plus interest and attorney's fees under the Statute.5
The court explained that it "distinguish[es] first-party and third-party
claims based on the claimant's relationship to the loss. [A] first-party
claim is stated when an insured seeks recovery for the insured's own loss,
whereas a third-party claim is stated when an insured seeks coverage for
injuries to a third party."'6 Based on this distinction, the court reasoned
that the insured's payment of an amount to a third party pursuant to a
settlement is not a loss to the insured.7 Characterizing the insured's claim
1. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 542.051-.061 (Vernon 2009) (the Statute) (formerly
codified as TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.55 (Vernon 1991) (Article 21.55)).
2. Id. § 542.060(a).
3. Id. § 542.051(2).
4. 51 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1018, 2008 Tex. LEXIS 575, at *38-40 (Tex. June 13, 2008).
5. Id. at *40.




for coverage of injuries sustained by a third party as a "classic third-party
claim" and emphasizing that the Statute was intended to apply only to
claims belonging to the insured, the court concluded that the insured was
not entitled to damages or attorney's fees under the Statute. 8
2. An Insured Cannot Recover Under the Statute in the Absence of
Coverage
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
confirmed that an insured cannot prevail under the Statute if the claim is
not covered under the policy. 9 The insured alleged that the insurers vio-
lated the Statute's requirement of notifying the insured "'in writing of the
acceptance or rejection of a claim no later than the 15th business day
after the date the insurer receives all items, statements, and forms re-
quired by the insurer to secure final proof of loss.' "10 The court first
explained that by its plain language, the Statute authorizes a private
cause of action only where the insurer "'is liable for a claim under an
insurance policy.'"11 Second, the court noted that Texas Supreme Court
had interpreted the prior statute, Article 21.55, as applying only where
coverage existed.12 Because the insurers were not liable for the insured's
claim for business interruption losses, the court determined that the in-
surers could not be liable for violating the Statute.13
B. THE UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES STATUTE 1 4
1. The Absence of Coverage Does Not Preclude Recovery Under
Chapter 541, but the Insured Must Show "Actual Damages"
In contrast to its conclusion with respect to the Prompt Payment of
Claims Statute, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Texas ruled that an insured may prevail on a Chapter 541 claim even in
the absence of coverage. 15 The insured here alleged "a violation of the
'reasonable explanation' provision of Section 541.060(a)(3). ' ' 16 Relying
on other decisions holding that the prior statute, Article 21.21, imposed
obligations on the insurer separate from its contractual duties under the
policy and thus applied even in the absence of coverage, the court held
8. Id. at *39-40.
9. S. Tex. Med. Clinics, P.A. v. CNA Fin. Corp., No. H-06-4041, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11460, at *34-36 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2008).
10. Id. at *34 (quoting TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.056(a) (Vernon 2009)).
11. Id. at *35 (quoting TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.060).
12. Id. at *35-36 (relying on Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Boyd, 177 S.W.3d
919, 922 (Tex. 2005)).
13. Id. at *35.
14. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 541.001-.454 (Chapter 541) (formerly codified at TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1991) (Article 21.21).
15. S. Tex. Med. Clinics, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11460, at *34, *36-39.
16. Id. at *34, *36 (referencing TEX. INS. CODE. ANN. § 541.060(a)(3) (defining an
unfair or deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance as the insurer's "failing to
promptly provide to a policyholder a reasonable explanation of the basis in the policy, in
relation to the facts or applicable law, for the insurer's denial of a claim or offer of a
compromise settlement of a claim")).
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that "[a] lack of coverage under the insurance policy does not automati-
cally bar recovery for a violation" of the reasonable explanation provi-
sion of Chapter 541.17
The court next addressed whether the insured had adequately proven
the "actual damages" required to prevail on a Chapter 541 claim.18 Be-
cause the policy did not cover the insured's business interruption losses,
the insurers did not wrongfully deny payment, and therefore, the insured
was not damaged by the denial of coverage.' 9 Further, the insured failed
to show any other "actual damages" caused by the insurers' alleged fail-
ure to explain the basis for the denial. 20 Accordingly, the court deter-
mined that a fact issue existed as to whether the insured could recover for
the alleged statutory violation and denied the insured's and the insurers'
motions for summary judgment on the Chapter 541 claim.21
2. Chapter 541 Claims Against Adjusters
Two decisions during this Survey period addressed the level of specific-
ity required to adequately plead a claim against an insurance adjuster
under Chapter 541.22 In First Baptist Church, the insured church sought
coverage for damages sustained from Hurricane Rita. The insurer re-
tained an independent insurance adjuster to adjust the claim. The insurer
eventually denied the claim, and the church sued the insurer (a citizen of
Iowa) and the adjuster (a citizen of Texas) in Texas state court. The in-
surer removed the action to federal court. In response to the insured's
motion to remand the action to state court, the insurer argued that the
adjuster was fraudulently joined and that the claims asserted against him
were invalid.23
In analyzing the validity of the claims against the adjuster, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas explained that
under Texas law a Chapter 541 claim may be asserted against adjusters
and agents in addition to insurers. 24 However, a pleading's mere refer-
ence to Chapter 541 is not sufficient to state a claim against an adjuster;
rather, the pleading must set forth specific facts detailing the alleged im-
proper conduct of the adjuster.2 5 The pleading at issue identified the in-
dividual as the adjuster and noted that an adjuster may be liable under
Chapter 541, but did not detail any specific statutory violations by the
individual.26 The court determined that there was no "factual fit" be-
17. Id. at *36-37.
18. Id. (quoting TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 541.151).
19. Id. at *38-39 n.6.
20. Id. at *37.
21. Id. at *37-39.
22. First Baptist Church v. GuideOne Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:07-CV-988, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 75961 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2008); Warren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No.
3:08-CV-0768-D, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68646 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2008).
23. First Baptist Church, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75961, at *1.4.
24. Id. at *16.
25. Id. at *13.
26. Id. at *19.
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tween the conclusory allegations and the theory of recovery.27 Because
the pleading did not allege valid state law claims against the adjuster, the
court denied the motion to remand.2 8
Applying the same standard under a similar procedural background,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
reached a different result in Warren.29 Following the insurer's denial of a
claim for underinsured motorist benefits, the insured sued the insurer and
Todd J. Dauper, the adjuster who handled the claim, for violation of
Chapter 541.30 After recognizing that Texas permits a private cause of
action against an adjuster for violation of Chapter 541, the court noted it
was a "close question" as to whether the petition, assessed under Texas's
notice pleading standard, sufficiently pleaded facts to state a Chapter 541
claim against Dauper.3 1 The court reasoned that because the claim
against Dauper was based on the processing and denial of the claim, the
allegation that Dauper was the adjuster responsible for the claim "does
implicate Dauper in the alleged misconduct in the processing and denial
of [the insured's] claim for benefits."'32 Even though certain of the factual
allegations did not name Dauper, the court determined that the pleading
was nevertheless adequate when these allegations were considered in
conjunction with the allegations that Dauper was the person handling the
claim and that he violated specified parts of Chapter 541. 3 3 Accordingly,
the court concluded that the factual allegations were sufficient to state a
claim against Dauper individually for violations of Chapter 541, that the
insurer failed to establish that Dauper was improperly joined, and there-
fore, remand was warranted.34
C. COMMON LAW BAD FAITH
In State Farm Lloyds v. Hamilton, the Dallas Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury finding of bad
faith for the insurer's denial of the homeowners' claim for foundation
damage.35 The insurer based its denial on a report from an engineer con-
cluding that the foundation damage was not caused by a plumbing leak
under the house. The insureds retained their own engineer who con-
cluded that the plumbing leak did cause the foundation damage. 36
The court first emphasized that the mere erroneous denial of claim
does not equate to bad faith.37 Rather, "an insurer breaches its duty of
27. Id.
28. Id. at *21.
29. Warren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 3:98-OV-0768, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 68646, at *9-15 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2008).
30. Id. at *2-3, *9-10.
31. Id. at *7-8, *10.
32. Id. at *13.
33. Id. at *14.
34. Id. at *12, *21.
35. 265 S.W.3d 725, 727, 729 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. dism'd).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 734.
2009] 1271
SMU LAW REVIEW
good faith and fair dealing when the insurer fails to settle a claim if the
insurer knew or should have known that it was reasonably clear that the
claim was covered."'38 Even where the insurer's coverage decision is
based on an expert report, the insurer may still be liable for bad faith "'if
there is evidence that the report was not objectively prepared or the in-
surer's reliance on the report was unreasonable.' "39
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court noted that the
jury was free to disbelieve the testimony offered by the insurer about the
engineer's independence and how the insurer did not track the outcomes
of the engineer's opinions. 40 Further, there was evidence that the engi-
neer was on the insurer's list of approved engineers, that more than fifty
percent of the engineer's business came from this insurer, that the insurer
had retained the engineer on 1,440 claims and had paid him more than $3
million over five years, and that the engineer had never testified against
this insurer's interests. 4' To the extent that the engineer was not indepen-
dent, it would have been reasonable for the jury to find that the engi-
neer's report was not objective and, therefore, that the insurer could not
reasonably rely on the report.42 Additionally, the jury may have found
that the report contained conflicts, did not state adequate grounds for its
conclusions, or failed to address alternative causes of the water damage. 43
As such, the jury could have determined that the insurer's investigation
or its reliance on the engineer's report was not reasonable. 44 Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the insureds, the court concluded
that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the impo-
sition of extra-contractual liability.45
II. CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT REJECTS
THE "WILKINSON EXCEPTION"
In Ulico Casualty Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, the Texas Supreme Court
addressed whether the doctrines of waiver and estoppel can be applied to
expand the scope of a policy's coverage. 46 The insured was sued a few
days before the expiration of the claims-made liability policy but did not
notify the insurer of the suit until after the policy had expired. Neverthe-
less, the insurer acknowledged the claim, told the insured the claim was
being reviewed for coverage, and advised that no defense costs could be
incurred or settlements made without the insurer's consent. A few
months later, the insurer issued a letter stating that the policy provided
38. Id.
39. Id. (quoting State Farm Lloyds v. Nicolau, 951 S.W.2d 444, 448 (Tex. 1997)).
40. Id. at 735.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 736-37.
44. Id. at 737.
45. Id.
46. 262 S.W.3d 773, 775 (Tex. 2008).
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for defense costs but that the insurer was reserving its rights to deny cov-
erage. Thirteen months later the insurer sent a letter to the insured
agreeing to reimburse the insured for defense costs. At that point the
insured had defended the suit and moved for summary judgment without
any reports or further contact with the insurer and without obtaining the
insurer's approval for actions or authorization to incur defense costs. Af-
ter the underlying case was resolved in its favor, the insured sought reim-
bursement of $635,000 in defense costs.47
The insurer sued for a declaration of noncoverage. The trial court en-
tered judgment for the insured based on jury findings that the insurer had
waived, or was barred from asserting, the coverage defense of late no-
tice.48 The court of appeals affirmed, relying on the so-called "Wilkinson
exception," which holds that "'if an insurer assumes the insured's defense
without obtaining a reservation of rights or a non-waiver agreement and
with knowledge of the facts indicating noncoverage, all policy defenses,
including those of noncoverage, are waived, or the insurer may be es-
topped from raising them.'" 49
Emphasizing that waiver and estoppel are distinct concepts, the su-
preme court explained that waiver is "the intentional relinquishment of a
right actually known, or intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming
that right," while estoppel "prevents one party from misleading another
to the other's detriment or to the misleading party's own benefit." 50 The
supreme court then identified the following problems with the Wilkinson
decision: (1) it does not indicate whether it is based on waiver or estop-
pel, (2) there was no finding of prejudice against the insured, and (3) the
court held that "an 'apparent' conflict of interest that 'might' arise suffi-
ciently justified judicial rewriting of the insurance contract to include a
risk not agreed to by the parties to the contract. '51 The supreme court
also disagreed with Wilkinson's suggestion that noncoverage is a right
that can be waived:
An insurer's actions can result in it being estopped from refusing to
make its insured whole for prejudice the insured suffers because the
insurer assumed the insured's defense, but estoppel does not work to
create a new insurance contract that covers a risk not agreed to by
the contracting parties. Thus there is no "right" of noncoverage that
is subject to being waived by the insurer, even by assumption of the
insured's defense with knowledge of facts indicating noncoverage
and without obtaining a valid reservation of rights or non-waiver
agreement. 52
47. Id. at 776.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 776, 781 (quoting Farmers Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 601
S.W.2d 520, 521-22 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.)).
50. Id. at 778.
51. Id. at 781.
52. Id. at 781-82 (internal citations omitted).
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After setting forth why the cases cited in Wilkinson do not support that
case's conclusion, the supreme court addressed the justification typically
given for the Wilkinson exception, that is, the "'apparent conflict of inter-
est that might arise when the insurer represents the insured in a lawsuit
against the insured and simultaneously formulates its defense against the
insured for noncoverage."' 5 3 Rejecting this justification, the supreme
court emphasized that while an insurer should be prevented from denying
benefits where the insured has been actually prejudiced by the insurer's
conduct, "the possibility that an apparent conflict of interest might arise
under these circumstances is insufficient justification for judicially rewrit-
ing the parties' agreement. ' 54 The court explained that its application of
estoppel in its prior Tilley decision turned on the fact that there was an
undisclosed conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured that
had actually prejudiced the insured. 55 Because the Tilley rule and the
ethics rules governing attorneys clearly require the disclosure to the in-
sured of any conflict of interest irrespective of the insurer's reservation of
rights, insureds are adequately protected "without the necessity of
remolding the doctrines of waiver and estoppel to create an anomaly in
the law by judicially rewriting agreements between insurers and
insureds. '56
The supreme court ultimately rejected the Wilkinson rule because it
"would afford the insured more contractual coverage than the policy pro-
vided, even if the insurer provides a perfect defense at no cost to the
insured and the insured suffers no prejudice. T57 Rather, the key inquiry
is whether the insured was prejudiced by an undisclosed conflict of inter-
est or other conduct on the part of the insurer.58 The supreme court
therefore adopted the following rule:
[I]f an insurer defends its insured when no coverage for the risk ex-
ists, the insurer's policy is not expanded to cover the risk simply be-
cause the insurer assumes control of the lawsuit defense. But, if the
insurer's actions prejudice the insured, the lack of coverage does not
preclude the insured from asserting an estoppel theory to recover for
any damages it sustains because of the insurer's actions. 59
B. THE INSURABILITY OF PUNITIVE OR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
In Fairfield Insurance Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, L.P., the Texas
Supreme Court addressed the following certified question from the Fifth
Circuit: "'Does Texas public policy prohibit a liability insurance provider
from indemnifying an award for punitive damages imposed on its insured
53. Id. at 785 (quoting Wilkinson, 601 S.W.2d at 522).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 785-86 (citing Employers Cas. Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 552, 561 (Tex. 1973)).
56. Id. at 786.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 786-87.
59. Id. at 787.
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because of gross negligence?' 60 The court adopted a two-part analysis
for resolving this issue.61 First, the court determines whether the punitive
damages are covered under the policy's plain language. 62 Second, if such
coverage exists, the court decides if Texas public policy permits coverage,
looking first to express statutory provisions.63 In the absence of a legisla-
tive directive, the "general public policies of Texas" are considered.
64
In deciding whether to invalidate an insurance contract on public policy
grounds, a court must weigh "Texas' general policy favoring freedom of
contract" against "the extent to which the agreement frustrates important
public policy."'65 This analysis considers the underlying purpose of exem-
plary damages, which is gleaned from the common law and legislative
developments.66 The recent legislative enactments show that the goal of
such damages is punishment, as opposed to compensation or deter-
rence. 67 Viewed in this light, insurance may be permissible in the circum-
stance of an insured corporation or business which is paying exemplary
damages due to the conduct of one employee, but the other employees
and management were not aware of or involved in the conduct. 68 Con-
versely, extreme circumstances may warrant the invalidation of coverage
to the extent that such coverage defeats the punitive purpose of exem-
plary damages.69
Accordingly, responding to the certified question, the supreme court
answered that Texas public policy does not prohibit coverage for exem-
plary damages in the context of workers' compensation.70 The supreme
court, however, emphasized that "without clear legislative intent to gen-
erally prohibit or allow the insurance of exemplary damages arising from
gross negligence," it was "declin[ing] to make a broad proclamation of
public policy," but was "instead offer[ing] some considerations applicable
to the analysis in other cases."'71 Consequently, while Fairfield provides
some guidance regarding insurability of exemplary damages, this issue
has not been finally resolved and will likely continue to be litigated.
For example, in American International Specialty Lines Insurance Co. v.
Res-Care Inc., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Fairfield
two-step framework to hold that Texas public policy barred coverage for
punitive damages under the circumstances of that case.72 The insured en-
tity, which operated a group home for mentally disabled individuals, was
60. 246 S.W.3d 653, 654 (Tex. 2008).




65. Id. at 663-64.
66. Id. at 666.
67. Id.




72. 529 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 2008).
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insured under a primary hospital professional liability and commercial
general liability policy as well as a commercial umbrella policy. The um-
brella policy excluded coverage for punitive or exemplary damages.73
The insured was sued in a wrongful death and survival suit arising out of
injuries to and the death of a patient with cerebral palsy on whom an
employee at the home had poured bleach. The insured and the insurer
entered into a non-waiver agreement which authorized the insurer to set-
tle the underlying suit and then seek recoupment from the insured of any
sums paid on uncovered claims. The underlying suit settled for $9 mil-
lion. In the subsequent coverage litigation, the district court allocated $4
million to covered actual damages and $5 million to uncovered punitive
damages and entered judgment against the insured for $5 million.74
In analyzing whether the punitive damages were covered, the Fifth Cir-
cuit first considered the plain language of both policies. Because the um-
brella policy specifically excluded coverage for punitive damages, the
insurer could recover any amounts that it had paid under the umbrella
policy for punitive damages. 75 However, because the primary policy was
silent as to punitive damages, the court decided it was "prudent to pre-
sume" that punitive damages were covered under the primary policy.76
Then examining legislative policy, the court explained that although the
legislature had generally prohibited "health care providers" from ob-
taining insurance for punitive damages, the insured was an "Intermediate
Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded," which was not included in the
Insurance Code's definition of "health care providers. '77 The court de-
termined that the legislature had not explicitly prohibited entities like the
insured from purchasing punitive damages coverage. 78
In the absence of a legislative directive, the Fifth Circuit considered
general public policy. 79 Analogizing its situation to the example given in
Fairfield, the insured argued that insurance was permissible here because
none of its officers, directors, or shareholders knew about or was involved
in the conduct.80 Rejecting this argument, the court emphasized that the
Fairfield court had expressed concern about insuring punitive damages in
situations of "'extreme and avoidable conduct that causes injury."' 8 ' The
court found that this case presented such a situation based on the allega-
tions that all of the defendants, including the entity, and not just a single
employee, were grossly negligent, and that state reports from other facili-
ties showed a pattern of poor conduct by the insured.8 2 The court deter-
73. Id. at 653-54.
74. Id. at 653-56.
75. Id. at 660-61.
76. Id. at 661.
77. Id. at 661-62.
78. Id. at 662.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 663.
81. Id. (quoting Fairfield Ins. Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, L.P., 246 S.W.3d 653, 670
(Tex. 2008)).
82. Id. at 663-64.
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mined that the circumstances of the injury and death were "so extreme
that the purposes of punishment and deterrence of conscious indifference
outweigh the normally strong public policy of permitting the right to con-
tract between insurer and insured. '8 3 Accordingly, the court concluded
that this case typified the situation recognized in Fairfield where public
policy required that the insured pay the punitive damages itself rather
than escaping punishment by shifting the burden to the insurer.84
C. A LIABILITY INSURER'S ERRONEOUS DENIAL OF COVERAGE
PROHIBITS IT FROM CHALLENGING THE REASONABLENESS OF
THE INSURED'S SETTLEMENT
In Evanston Insurance Co. v. ATOFINA Petrochemicals, Inc., the Texas
Supreme Court held that a liability insurer which wrongfully denies cov-
erage is barred from challenging the reasonableness of the amount of the
insured's settlement with the third-party claimant. 85 The insured was
sued and requested coverage from its liability insurer, which denied cov-
erage based on the policy's terms. The insured then brought the insurer
into the underlying suit as a third-party defendant, seeking a declaration
of coverage. When the insurer continued to deny coverage in its plead-
ings, the insured settled with the underlying claimants. The insured then
continued the litigation of the coverage issues against the insurer, and it
was determined that the insurer had wrongfully denied coverage.8 6
The supreme court explained that its last occasion to address this issue
was in Employers Casualty Co. v. Block,87 where it had held that "if an
insurer wrongfully denies coverage and its insured then enters into an
agreed judgment, the insurer is barred from challenging the reasonable-
ness of the settlement amount. ' 88 The supreme court acknowledged that
the instant case differed from Block in several respects, including the
forms of the settlements and the policy claims. 89 First, the insurer in
Block breached the duty to defend; conversely, although the insurer in
ATOFINA had wrongfully denied coverage, no duty to defend was impli-
cated.90 Second, Block involved an agreed judgment between the insured
and the underlying claimant; conversely, ATOFINA, involved a settle-
ment contract between the insured and the underlying claimants.9 1 De-
spite these distinctions, the supreme court determined that Block
nevertheless governed because its rule was based on principles of waiver
and estoppel and did not turn on the type of duty the insurer breached or
the presence of a judgment. 92 As such, the key inquiry is whether the
83. Id. at 664.
84. Id,
85. 51 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1018, 2008 Tex. LEXIS 575, at *27-37 (Tex. June 13, 2008).
86. Id. at *24, *29.
87. 744 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1988).
88. ATOFINA, 2008 Tex. LEXIS 575, at *27 (referencing Block, 744 S.W.2d at 943).
89. Id. at *27-29.
90. Id. at *29-30.




insurer received notice and could have participated in the settlement ne-
gotiations. 93 This inquiry is not altered by the particular source of the
insurer's attack on the settlement amount, i.e., a policy provision versus
the common law reasonableness requirement. 94 "Had [the insurer] not
unconditionally denied coverage, it too would have been able to influence
the amount of the settlement. For these reasons, the difference in policy
claims and the absence of a formal judgment do not persuade us to aban-
don Block here." 95
The supreme court also acknowledged that due to Block's procedural
posture of the underlying claimant suing the insurer as a judgment credi-
tor, it previously expressed "some disapproval" of Block in State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandy,96 which held that "[iun no event, however,
is a judgment for plaintiff against defendant, rendered without a fully ad-
versarial trial, binding on defendant's insurer or admissible as evidence of
damages in an action against defendant's insurer by plaintiff as defen-
dant's assignee."' 97 Despite this holding in Gandy, the supreme court rea-
soned that Block nevertheless governed the instant case. 98 First, because
"Gandy's holding was explicit and narrow, applying only to a specific set
of assignments with special attributes," its "invalidation applies only to
cases that present its five unique elements." 99 Since the insured in
ATOFINA made no assignment of its claim against the insurer and sued
the insurer directly, "Gandy's key factual predicate is missing," thereby
"remov[ing] this case from the formal bounds of Gandy."'00
Second, the supreme court explained that Gandy's reason for invalidat-
ing assignments was that they made it difficult to evaluate the merits of
the underlying claim by "prolonging disputes and distorting trial litigation
motives"; if, however, this difficulty is not present in a particular case, it
should not be a basis to invalidate a settlement.101 The insurer's reasona-
bleness challenge in ATOFINA did not implicate these issues because: (1)
prohibiting such challenges does not prolong disputes, but rather shortens
them, and (2) there was no risk of distorting motives because the insured
had settled without knowing whether coverage would exist.10 2 The su-
preme court decided that application of the Block rule in this circum-
stance "will encourage early intervention by the insurers who are best
positioned to evaluate the worth of claims during settlement discus-
sions. 10 3 In the absence of "relevant factual differences or Gandy con-
cerns to dissuade us from following Block," the supreme court held that
93. Id.
94. Id. at *32.
95. Id. at *32-33.
96. 925 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1996).
97. ATOFINA, 2008 Tex. LEXIS 575, at *34-35 (quoting Gandy, 925 S.W.2d at 714).
98. Id. at *35.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at *35-36.
102. Id. at *36-37.
103. Id. at *37.
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the insurer's denial estopped it from contesting the reasonableness of the
settlement and that the insurer was bound to pay the settlement. 10 4
D. THE DUTY TO DEFEND
1. Whether There Is an Exception to the "Eight-Corners" Rule That
Permits Consideration of Extrinsic Evidence in Determining
the Duty to Defend
An ongoing issue of debate in Texas has been whether an exception to
the "eight-corners" rule exists to permit the consideration of extrinsic evi-
dence in determining an insurer's duty to defend. In 2006, the Texas Su-
preme Court provided some guidance on this issue in GuideOne Elite
Insurance Co. v. Fielder Road Baptist Church, where it refused to adopt
any exception to the "eight-corners" rule for "liability only" or "overlap-
ping/mixed fact" scenarios.10 5 The GuideOne court, however, did not ex-
pressly rule out the use of extrinsic evidence that is relevant solely to a
discrete issue of coverage that does not overlap with the liability issues.
Accordingly, Texas courts have continued to grapple with whether, and
under what circumstances, extrinsic evidence can be admitted to deter-
mine the insurer's duty to defend.
The Texas Supreme Court had another opportunity to address this is-
sue in Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Nokia, Inc.106 The insurers
sought consideration of extrinsic evidence in the form of briefs filed by
the plaintiffs in the underlying suit.10 7 The insured argued that the extrin-
sic evidence could not be considered because it went to the merits of the
underlying case.108 The supreme court initially explained that although
some states have allowed exceptions to the eight-corners rule in limited
circumstances, "Texas has not."10 9 The supreme court further explained
that in GuideOne, it "declined to recognize an exception to the eight-
corners rule for 'overlapping' evidence that implicated both coverage and
the merits of the claim."110 Furthermore, the court recognized that in
GuideOne it had acknowledged that the Fifth Circuit has opined that if
the supreme court were to recognize exceptions to the eight-corners rule,
it would likely do so in cases "'when it is initially impossible to discern
whether coverage is potentially implicated and when the extrinsic evi-
dence goes solely to a fundamental issue of coverage which does not
overlap with the merits of or engage the truth or falsity of any facts al-
leged in the underlying case.'""
104. Id.
105. 197 S.W.3d 305, 310 (Tex. 2006).
106. 268 S.W.3d 487, 497-98 (Tex. 2008).
107. Id. at 497.
108. Id. at 498.
109. Id. at 497.
110. Id.
111. Id. (quoting GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Road Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d
305, 309 (Tex. 2006)) (quoting Northfield Ins. Co. v. Loving Home Care Inc., 363 F.3d 523,
531 (5th Cir. 2004)).
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The supreme court decided that it did not need to reach this issue, how-
ever, because the insured had alleged damages for bodily injury in the
underlying suit.112 Thus, according to the supreme court, this was not a
situation where it was "initially impossible to determine whether cover-
age is potentially implicated" 113 The supreme court then concluded that
even if it were to recognize the Northfield exception to the eight-corners
rule, "this case would not fit within its parameters. Accordingly, we de-
cline to do so. ' '114
With the Texas Supreme Court again passing on the opportunity to re-
solve this issue, courts have continued to reach varying results when faced
with extrinsic evidence, as demonstrated by three opinions issued during
this Survey period by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas. First, in Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Employers
Mutual Casualty Co., the insurer sought to use extrinsic evidence to show
that the insured was aware of the property damage to the underlying
claimant's building before the policy took effect and that coverage was
therefore barred by the fortuity doctrine and the policy's known loss ex-
clusion. 11 5 While acknowledging that the supreme court "has not iterated
any exception to the eight-corners rule," the Southern District did note
the exception articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Northfield.116 The court,
however, determined that the proffered extrinsic evidence did not fit
within this "presumed narrow exception" for two reasons. First, the evi-
dence the insurers sought to rely upon was produced by the insured dur-
ing discovery in the underlying suit and obtained from the insured's
defense counsel. 117 Under Texas law, "facts developed during [the] litiga-
tion of [an] underlying suit do not affect [the] duty to defend." 118 "Sec-
ond, the timing and nature of the alleged property damage overlap[ped]
at least in part with the merits of [the underlying] claims."' 1 9 Conse-
quently, the court concluded that the extrinsic evidence could not be con-
sidered and that, in the absence of any facts in the pleading suggesting
that the insured was aware of any property damage before the effective
date of the policy, the allegations potentially supported a covered claim,
thereby triggering the duty to defend. 120
In Willbros RPI, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., Willbros RPI, Inc.
(Willbros) sought coverage as an additional insured under a policy in
which it was not named as an additional insured but that did contain a
blanket endorsement that provided additional insured coverage to any
organization whom the named insured agreed to add as an insured. 121
112. Id.
113. Id. at 498.
114. Id.
115. 586 F. Supp. 2d 718, 725-26 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
116. Id. at 726.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 726-28.
120. Id. at 728.
121. No. H-07-2479, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99851, at *10-11 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2008).
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Willbros argued that a master service agreement (MSA) it had with the
named insured allowed it to acquire status as an additional insured be-
cause the MSA required that Willbros and its successors be added as an
additional insured under all liability policies. 12 2 The insurer argued that
the MSA was outside the eight-corners rule and could not be considered.
The Southern District explained that while the insurer correctly argued
that reference to the usual documents (the pleading and the policy) could
not alone determine coverage here, the insurer's "contention that Texas
forbids extrinsic evidence does not reflect current Texas law."' 123 The
court characterized GuideOne as "recogniz[ing] a narrow exception to
the eight corners rule" stated by the Fifth Circuit in Northfield.124 The
court reasoned that consideration of the MSA "fit[ ] neatly within this
exception" because: (1) a coverage determination was "initially impossi-
ble" by only reference to the policy and the pleading, (2) use of the MSA
addressed the "fundamental issue of coverage" regarding whether Willb-
ros qualified as an insured, and (3) no danger existed for overlapping or
"questioning the truth or falsity of the facts alleged" in the underlying
suit.
12 5
The court further reasoned that even without use of the Northfield
exception, consideration of the MSA was justified because the policy
permitted and required the parties to "go beyond its four corners to de-
termine whether [Willbros qualified as] an additional insured. ' 126 Stated
differently, incorporation of a "blanket endorsement 'effectively incorpo-
rates' any written agreement under which [the named insured] agreed to
add a person or organization as an insured. ' 127 The court therefore con-
cluded that it would consider the MSA "both [for] extrinsic evidence, for
which an exception applies, and as part of the [policy] itself.' 28
Lastly, in Insurance Corp. of Hannover v. Skanska USA Building, Inc.,
the Southern District stated that the GuideOne court "appeared to ap-
prove of the [Northfield] exception, but made no ruling explicitly recog-
nizing the exception as such a holding was not necessary to resolve the
issues before the court. ' 129 The policy at issue excluded coverage for
work performed by the insured related to the construction of condomini-
ums. The insureds submitted extrinsic evidence in the form of affidavits
averring that the buildings included in the project did not contain condo-
miniums.1 30 The court reasoned that the extrinsic evidence regarding the
type of buildings involved did not address the merits of the underlying
claims regarding whether actual damage to the buildings occurred, but
122. Id. at *11.
123. Id. at *11-12.
124. Id. at *12-13.




129. No. B-05-304, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51520, at *13 (S.D. Tex. July 3, 2008).
130. Id. at *18-20.
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instead "went to the fundamental issue of coverage," specifically
"whether the damage[s] alleged [fell] within the coverage of the pol-
icy."'1 31 The court therefore concluded that under Northfield, it could re-
view the affidavits to the extent they provided evidence on the
fundamental coverage issue.132
E. COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY (CGL) POLICIES
1. The Texas Supreme Court Adopts the "Actual Injury" Rule to
Determine When Property Damage "Occurs"
In Don's Building Supply, Inc. v. OneBeacon Insurance Co., the Texas
Supreme Court, answering certified questions from the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, resolved a split among Texas courts by adopting the
"actual injury" rule to determine when property damage "occurs" under
an occurrence-based commercial general liability (CGL) policy, stating
that "the key date is when injury happens, not when someone happens
upon it. '133
The insured sought coverage for several lawsuits filed against it by
homeowners claiming damage to their homes due to defective Exterior
Insulation and Finish Systems (EIFS) sold by the insured. The homeown-
ers alleged that the defective EIFS allowed moisture to seep into wall
cavities behind the siding and caused wood rot and other damages. The
homeowners asserted that the damage began at the time of the first water
penetration, but pled the discovery rule seeking to avoid the statutes of
limitations and argued that the damage was hidden from view and not
discoverable or readily apparent until after the policy period ended.134 In
the insurer's declaratory judgment action, the district court ruled that the
duty to defend does not arise until the damage becomes identifiable. 135
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit certified the following coverage trigger-date
questions to the Texas Supreme Court:
When not specified by the relevant policy, what is the proper rule
under Texas law for determining the time at which property damage
occurs for purposes of an occurrence-based commercial general lia-
bility insurance policy?
Under the rule identified in the answer to the first question, have the
pleadings in lawsuits against an insured alleged that property damage
occurred within the policy period of an occurrence-based commercial
general liability insurance policy, such that the insurer's duty to de-
fend and indemnify the insured is triggered, when the pleadings al-
lege that actual damage was continuing and progressing during the
policy period, but remained undiscoverable and not readily apparent
for purposes of the discovery rule until after the policy period ended
131. Id. at *21.
132. Id.
133. 267 S.W.3d 20, 22, 24 (Tex. 2008).
134. Id. at 22-23.
135. Id. at 23
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because the internal damage was hidden from view by an undam-
aged exterior surface?1 36
Focusing on the plain meaning of the policy provisions, the supreme
court held the property damage occurred when actual physical damage to
the property occurred. 137 "The policy says as much, defining property
damage as '[p]hysical injury to tangible property,' and explicitly stating
that coverage is available if and only if 'property damage' occurs during
the policy period. '138 As applied to the instant case, property damage
occurred when a home suffered "wood rot or other physical damage"; the
date that the insured could or would have discovered the physical damage
is irrelevant under the policy. 139
In reaching this holding, the supreme court noted that the issue of
when property damage occurs had not been uniformly resolved, resulting
in courts adopting varying approaches. 140 Many courts agreed that the
actual injury or "injury-in-fact" approach should apply,1 4' while others,
including several Texas appellate courts, adopted the "manifestation
rule[, which] imposes a duty to defend only if the property damage be-
came evident or discoverable during the policy term. ' 142 Other courts
adopted the "exposure rule," which provides that coverage is triggered "if
the plaintiff is exposed to whatever agent ultimately results in personal
injury or property damage during the policy period. ' 143 Still other courts
adopted varying approaches, including multiple trigger rules or rules that
examined the allegations of the date of the alleged negligent conduct
rather than the date of actual injury.144
Noting that it was again being asked "to construe a widely used CGL
policy where 'unfortunately there is no consensus on the policy's meaning
under the circumstances posed here,"' the supreme court explained its
reasoning for rejecting the other approaches and adopting the actual in-
jury rule. 145 Notably, the policy language itself made no provision for the
manifestation or exposure rules given the straightforward wording of the
policy providing coverage if the property damage "'occurs during the pol-
icy period"' and defining property damage as "'[p]hysical injury to tangi-
ble property."' 146
The supreme court ultimately reasoned that the policy "asks when
damage happened, not whether it was manifest, patent, visible, apparent,
obvious, perceptible, discovered, discoverable, capable of detection, or
136. Id. at 23, 30-31.
137. Id. at 24.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 24-25.
141. Id. at 25.
142. Id. at 25-26.
143. Id. at 27-28.
144. Id. at 28.
145. Id. at 28-30.
146. Id. at 28-29.
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anything similar. ' 147 Furthermore, "[o]ccurred means when damage oc-
curred, not when discovery occurred. ' 148 The supreme court, however,
did acknowledge that the duty to defend is driven by the policy language
itself, and given the language varies from policy to policy, it was not
adopting a universal rule "for determining when an insurer's duty to de-
fend a claim is triggered. '149
Turning to the second certified question, and in light of its answer to
the first certified question, the supreme court recognized that under the
actual injury rule, a plaintiff's claim that an insured's allegedly defective
product caused actual physical damage to tangible property would trigger
the insurer's duty to defend.150 The supreme court continued, "[t]his
duty is not diminished because the property damage was undiscoverable,
or not readily apparent or 'manifest,' until after the policy period ended.
Nor does it depend on ... a valid limitations defense. The parties could
have conditioned coverage on identifiability, but the contract imposes no
such limitation."'151
2. Whether Claims for Biological Injuries or Effects from Radiation
from Wireless Phones Allege "Damages Because of Bodily
Injury" Under a CGL Policy
In Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Nokia, Inc., the insured wireless
telephone manufacturer was sued in a number of class actions in which
claimants alleged that wireless phones emitted radio frequency radiation
(RFR) that caused "biological injury. ' 152 The insured tendered the de-
fense to its CGL carrier, which agreed to defend the suits under a reser-
vation of rights. In the insurers' declaratory judgment action, the trial
court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment. The court of
appeals reversed with respect to all of the underlying claims except one,
holding that the claimants had alleged "bodily injury" and sought "dam-
ages because of bodily injury" as required under the CGL policy.' 53 The
court of appeals affirmed that the insurer did not have a duty to defend
one underlying claim that had disclaimed personal injuries and sought
only economic damages and equitable relief.1 54
The policy language required the insurer to pay all sums which the in-
sured became legally obligated to pay "'as damages because of... bodily
injury"' and defined bodily injury as "'bodily injury, sickness or disease
sustained by a person, including death resulting from any of these at any
time." 155 The supreme court, therefore, had to determine if "biological
147. Id. at 30.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 31.
151. Id. at 31-32.
152. 268 S.W.3d 487, 488-89 (Tex. 2008).
153. Id. at 488-90.
154. Id. at 490.
155. Id. at 491.
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injury" or "biological effects" qualified as "bodily injury," which "re-
quires an injury to the physical structure of the human body. 1 56
In the underlying complaints, plaintiffs alleged they "were exposed to
RFR from their phones and thus subjected to 'RFR's biological effects
and the risk to human health arising [from RFR]."1 57 Relying upon dic-
tionary definitions and similar decisions from the Fourth and Ninth Cir-
cuits, the court of appeals concluded that the plaintiffs had sufficiently
alleged "bodily injury" under the policies. 158 Agreeing with that analysis,
the supreme court concluded that "the biological injuries alleged by the
plaintiffs potentially state a claim for bodily injuries under the policies,
much like the subclinical injuries alleged by plaintiffs who have been ex-
posed to asbestos."'1 59
Having resolved the "bodily injury" issue, the supreme court turned to
whether the plaintiffs sought "damages.' 160 The insurers argued that the
plaintiffs sought only headsets, and not damages, thereby removing the
claims from coverage, whereas the insured argued that the plaintiffs
sought damages including, but not limited to, the headsets. 16 1 Agreeing
with the insured, the supreme court reasoned that plaintiffs asserted that
they had been injured and sought damages based on their physical expo-
sure to radiation in addition to compensation for the cost of the head-
sets. 162 The supreme court therefore concluded that the underlying cases
sought "damages."1 63
Lastly, the supreme court addressed the policy's requirement that the
damages be "because of" bodily injury. 164 The insurers argued that in-
cluding future purchasers in the putative class negated the duty to defend
because it was impossible for those future purchasers to have suffered
damages due to bodily injury. 165 Stating that the insurers' argument mis-
construed the nature of the duty to defend, the court explained that the
duty to defend is triggered by the inclusion of potentially covered claims
and not negated by the inclusion of uncovered claims. 166
156. Id. at 492 (quoting Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tex.
1997)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 492-93.
159. Id. at 493.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 493-94.
162. Id. at 494.
163. Id. at 494-95.
164. Id. at 495-96.
165. Id. at 495.
166. Id. at 495-96. On the same day the Zurich decision was handed down, the Texas
Supreme Court issued two additional opinions addressing other insurers' obligations with
respect to the same underlying cases at issue in Zurich, concluding that Zurich was disposi-
tive and required the other insurers to defend those cases. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v.
Cellular One Group, 268 S.W.3d 505,505 (Tex. 2008); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Am.,
268 S.W.3d 506, 506 (Tex. 2008).
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3. Policy Language Affording Additional Insured Coverage with
Respect to the Named Insured's Operations Requires Only a
Causal Connection or Relation Between the Event
and the Operations, Not Proximate or Legal
Causation
In addition to the issues discussed earlier in this article, the Texas Su-
preme Court's opinion in Evanston Insurance Co. v. ATOFINA Petro-
chemicals, Inc., also addressed the interplay between a contractual
indemnity provision and a service contract's requirement to name an ad-
ditional insured, specifically whether a liability policy purchased to secure
the insured's indemnity obligation in a service contract with a third party
also provided direct liability coverage for the third party. 167 ATOFINA
Petrochemicals, Inc. (ATOFINA) contracted with Triple S Industrial Cor-
poration (Triple S) to perform maintenance and construction work at its
refinery. Pursuant to the service contract, Triple S agreed to indemnify
ATOFINA from all personal injuries and property losses sustained during
the performance of the contract, except to the extent that the loss was
attributable to ATOFINA. Triple S was also required to procure a CGL
policy and a following-form excess or umbrella policy showing ATOFINA
as an additional insured. 168 A Triple S employee who was working at the
ATOFINA facility pursuant to the service contract drowned after he fell
through the roof of a storage tank. The employee's survivors sued Triple
S and ATOFINA for wrongful death. After the primary insurer tendered
its policy limits, ATOFINA sought coverage as an additional insured
under Evanston Insurance Company's (Evanston) umbrella policy. Ev-
anston denied coverage on the ground that the loss was caused by
ATOFINA's negligence. 169
The supreme court explained that although the service contract pre-
cluded ATOFINA's indemnification by Triple S if the loss was occasioned
in any way by ATOFINA's negligence, ATOFINA was not. seeking in-
demnity from Triple S; instead, ATOFINA's position was that it was enti-
tled to indemnification from Evanston based on its status as an additional
insured on the umbrella policy issued to Triple S.170 Thus, contrary to the
court of appeals' focus on the service contract's indemnity agreement, the
supreme court focused on the terms of the umbrella policy itself, which
included as an additional insured "[a] person or organization for whom
you have agreed to provide insurance as is afforded by this policy; but
that person or organization is an insured only with respect to operations
performed by you or on your behalf, or facilities owned or used by
you. '171 Evanston argued that this language did not provide coverage to
an additional insured for its own negligence, that because the employee's
167. 51 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1018, 2008 Tex. LEXIS 575, at *1 (Tex. June 13, 2008).
168. Id. at *2-3.
169. Id. at *4.
170. Id. at *6.
171. Id. at *7.
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death was caused solely by ATOFINA's negligence, the death did not
"respect" operations performed by Triple S, and that ATOFINA there-
fore did not qualify as an additional insured. 172
The supreme court noted that the courts of appeals had reached diver-
gent results in addressing such additional insured provisions, with some
adopting a fault-based interpretation where an insurer must defend only
if the insured's wrongful act during the operation caused the injury. 173
Conversely, other courts have adopted a more liberal causation theory,
finding that the loss could be "with respect to liability arising out of" the
named insured's operations, and therefore covered, notwithstanding alle-
gations that the additional insured acted negligently. 174 The supreme
court adopted the second approach stated in Admiral and McCarthy:
[R]egardless of the underlying service agreement's terms, we do not
follow Granite because the fault-based interpretation of this kind of
additional insured endorsement no longer prevails. Instead, we in-
terpret "with respect to operations" under a broader theory of causa-
tion. Generally, an event "respects" operations if there exists "a
causal connection or relation" between the event and the operations;
we do not require proximate cause or legal causation. In cases in
which the premises condition caused a personal injury, the injury re-
spects an operation if the operation brings the person to the premises
for purposes of that operation. The particular attribution of fault
between insured and additional insured does not change the
outcome. 175
Applying these principles, the court found that the injury respected op-
erations performed by Triple S because the injured employee was em-
ployed by Triple S and was present at ATOFINA's facility for purposes of
Triple S's operations when the accident occurred.176 Accordingly, the
court concluded that even if ATOFINA's negligence alone caused the in-
jury, the umbrella policy's additional insured provision afforded direct
insurance coverage to ATOFINA. 177
III. INSURERS' USE OF "CAPTIVE COUNSEL"
TO DEFEND INSUREDS
In Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v. American Home Assur-
ance Co., the Texas Supreme Court addressed whether it is proper for a
liability insurer to use its "captive counsel" to defend an insured and
172. Id. at *7-8.
173. Id. at *8 (citing Granite Constr. Co. v. Bituminous Ins. Cos., 832 S.W.2d 427, 428
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, no writ) (determining that the claim did not "aris[e] out of
operations performed" by the insured because only the additional insured company was
responsible for the injury)).
174. Id. at *10-11 (citing McCarthy Bros. Co. v. Cont'l Lloyds Ins. Co., 7 S.W.3d 725,
727, 730-31 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.); Admiral Ins. Co. v. Trident NGL, Inc., 988
S.W.2d 451, 453-55 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied)).
175. Id. at *12.
176. Id. at *15-16.
177. Id. at *16.
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whether such practice constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. 178
The supreme court explained that liability insurance policies commonly
require that an insurer indemnify its insured from liability for covered
claims, and that the insurer has the duty and the right to defend such
claims, which, in turn, gives the insurer exclusive control over the de-
fense. 179 An insurer will usually retain an attorney in private practice to
represent its insured against such claims. However, for decades insurers
have also used staff attorneys, i.e., salaried employees of the insurer, to
assist in the defense. 180
Furthermore, the supreme court explained that a corporation may em-
ploy in-house attorneys to represent its own interests, but that the in-
house attorneys cannot engage in the practice of law by providing legal
representation or advice to others with dissimilar interests. 181 Because an
insurer faces potential indemnity obligations, it has a direct and substan-
tial financial interest in defending the claims against its insured. 8 2 Al-
though the insurer's and the insured's interests are often aligned toward
defeating the plaintiff's claims, the insurer's and the insured's interests
can diverge, e.g., when the insured submits a noncovered or partially-
covered claim under the policy. 183 The propriety of the insurer's use of
staff attorneys turns on whether the insurer "is representing its own inter-
ests, which is permitted, or engaging in the unauthorized practice of law,
which is not.' 84 Noting that several other states permit the use of staff
attorneys, the supreme court held that an insurer "may use staff attorneys
to defend a claim against its insured if the insurer's interest and the in-
sured's interest are congruent, but not otherwise.' 85 Congruent interests
exist when there are no conflicts of interest and the insured and insurer
are aligned in defeating the claims against the insured.186 The supreme
court further held that a staff attorney must fully disclose his or her affili-
ation with the insurer to the insured. 187
In reaching this holding, the supreme court noted that whether the
claim is covered and within the policy limits is the most common conflict
between an insurer and an insured. 8 8 When a coverage issue exists, the
insurer usually issues a reservation of rights letter, agreeing to defend the
insured without waiving its right to later deny coverage.' 89 The supreme
court emphasized that a reservation of rights letter, by itself, does not
ordinarily create a conflict of interest between the insurer and the in-







185. Id. at 26-27.
186. Id. at 27.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 42-43.
189. Id. at 43.
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sured, but rather simply recognizes the possibility that such a conflict may
arise in the future. 190 Therefore, while instructing that "[d]eclining repre-
sentation is the safer course," the supreme court decided it "cannot say as
a blanket rule that a staff attorney can never represent an insured under a
routine reservation of rights."' 91
IV. INSURER'S RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT
FROM A CO-INSURER
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas ex-
tended the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Mid-Continent Insurance
Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.192 to the duty to defend, holding that
Mid-Continent barred an insurer's claim for reimbursement from a co-
insurer of amounts the insurer incurred to defend their common insured
when the co-insurer wrongfully refused to contribute to the defense. 193
First addressing the insurer's contribution claim, the Southern District ex-
plained that when seeking contribution, a party must show that it has
made a compulsory payment or other discharge of its fair share of the
several insurers' common obligation or burden.194
Like the policies in Mid-Continent, the policies here contained "other
insurance" or "pro rata" clauses which provided that the insurers' respec-
tive "obligations [were limited] to an equal share of a covered loss, or a
proportion of such loss based on a ratio of the limit of insurance under
the policy to the total limits of coverage under all policies."' 95 Pursuant
to Mid-Continent, these clauses render the contractual obligations of [the
respective insurers] 'several and independent of each other, not joint." 1 96
The court determined that the "independence of these contractual obliga-
tions affects not only the duty to indemnify, as discussed in Mid-Conti-
nent, but necessarily applies with equal force to the duty to defend."1 97
The court, therefore, concluded that by including the "other insurance"
clauses, the policies defeated the paying insurer's contribution claim be-
cause the otherwise shared contractual obligations, including the duty to
defend, became independent duties that could be enforced only by the
insured. 198 Accordingly, the court ruled that the non-paying insurer was
entitled to summary judgment on the paying insurer's contribution
claim. 199
190. Id.
191. Id. at 44; see also Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 264 S.W.3d 742, 743 (Tex. 2008).
192. 236 S.W.3d 765 (Tex. 2007).
193. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 586 F. Supp. 2d 718, 728-30
(S.D. Tex. 2008).
194. Id. at 729.
195. Id. at 729-30.






Turning to the insurer's subrogation claim, the court explained that its
holding from Mid-Continent "forecloses contractual and equitable subro-
gation claims between co-insurers when the insured has been fully com-
pensated" based on "the principle that an insured cannot obtain more
than a single recovery for any loss, and that an insurer asserting rights in
subrogation stands in the shoes of its insured. '200 An impermissible
double recovery would therefore result if the court allowed an insured to
recover a portion of the costs paid by another insurer.201 The court rea-
soned that the insured had not incurred any loss, notwithstanding the
non-paying insurer's breach of the duty to defend, because the paying
insurer had borne all costs associated with the insured's defense. 20 2 The
court therefore concluded that under Mid-Continent, if the insured in-
curred no loss, the paying insurer's subrogation claim is precluded.20 3
200. Id. at 730-31.
201. Id. at 731.
202. Id.
203. Id.; see also Lexington Ins. Co. v. Chicago Ins. Co., No. H-06-1741, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 60629 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2008) (applying Mid-Continent to bar insurer's contribu-
tion and subrogation claims against co-insurer).
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